To enhance the performance of irrigation schemes, the Algerian government has adopted significant reforms. Structural reform has involved the decentralization of water resource management and the establishment of an autonomous irrigation agency. Regulatory reform has focused on water pricing with the goal of cost recovery. In addition, the government earmarked public investment for a ten-year integrated water resource management initiative. Hence, the general objective of this paper is to assess the effects of water reforms on the performance of irrigation scheme management in Algeria. We used various performance indicators to evaluate two selected irrigation schemes: the East and West Mitidja. The results showed that the water policy implemented did not create a sustainable environment for the irrigation schemes. The lack of coordination between water agencies has led to poor monitoring of scarce watersupply services. Furthermore, the weak involvement of stakeholders as well as the indifference of local administrations exacerbated irrigation management issues. The water price did not reflect the total cost of supply, and the maintenance budgets in both irrigation schemes are below international and regional norms. This contributed to the deterioration of irrigation infrastructure, to greater water conveyance losses and to reduced delivery efficiency. Many factors were found to affect irrigation sustainability, such as fee collection constraints, water allocation constraints, land reform, disputes among members of the collective farms, inadequacy of the irrigation system components with regard to farm configuration, water theft, and acts of vandalism on the hydromechanic equipment. These constraints led to low equilibrium cycles for both schemes.
Introduction
Water resources in Algeria are very limited and unequally distributed in space and time. The country has one of the lowest per capita water supplies in the world. The renewable water resources in Algeria amount to 600 m3 per-capita per year [1] , which is below the UN threshold for water poverty (1000 m3/year/ capita). Irrigated agriculture is still the largest water user in the country, using about 65% of all water resources. However, the increasing competition over scarce water resources due to rapid urbanization has become a severe constraint and a serious threat to irrigated agriculture sustainability. For decades, during the socialist era in Algeria, water management has been characterized by centralized planning and management, an absence of water policy, organizational instability, supply-based water management, inadequate budgets allocated to irrigation authorities, poor operation and maintenance, unsustainability, low-level irrigation facilities, low productivity, and low water-and land-use efficiency [2] [3] [4] [5] [6] [7] .
Since the 1980s, the government has embarked on a program to decentralize water sector management. Irrigation scheme management was taken over by the irrigation agencies (Office des Périmètres Irrigués) and was financed through water sales and state subsidies. Moreover, in 1996, Algerian water policymakers introduced the concept of integrated water resource management in the watershed. The policy is designed around three main principles: water is an economic good, it is scarce and vulnerable, and it is the responsibility of all. With the new water code of 1996, the water tariff was recognized as an important instrument to conserve water, improve water use efficiency, and to provide for the sustainability of irrigation schemes. The principle of cost recovery has been established, and the irrigation water prices (with a two-part tariff structure) increased in 1998 and 2005.
In 2000, the government earmarked public investment for a ten-year integrated water resource management initiative. All directorates related to the irrigation sector have been transferred to the new ministry of water resources (created in 2000), and a new National Plan for Water was put in place in 2005. The move established an action plan for implementing an integrated water resource management framework involving all stakeholders in the water sector. In the same year, a new water code was adopted, and new institutional arrangements for irrigation water resources were undertaken. These institutional arrangements restructured the irrigation agencies into one irrigation management body, the ONID (National Organization for Irrigation and Drainage), which was set up as a financially independent legal entity.
The water policy was meant to initiate the sustainable development of irrigated agriculture, to provide an incentive framework towards improving the efficiency of irrigation, to facilitate self-management, and to ensure the financial viability of irrigation schemes. Hence, the research questions of this study were specifically: (1) Did the water policy achieve the objective, that is, irrigation scheme viability? (2) What are the factors affecting the sustainable management of irrigation schemes? Therefore, the overall aim of this research study is to assess the impact of changes in water policy on irrigation scheme management in Algeria.
Methodology
Two irrigation schemes were selected for this study: East and West Mitidja, which are located in the most fertile region of northern Algeria. East and West Mitidja cover an agricultural area of 18,000 ha and 9,250 ha, respectively. Farmers in both schemes are classified in three groups: collective state farms, individual state farms, and private farms. The surface irrigation water for the East Mitidja scheme is provided by Hamiz dam, the Reghaia marsh, and the Boureah pumping station. The East Mitidja scheme has a total theoretical storage capacity of 33 million cubic meters. The West Mitidja scheme is supplied from El-Moustaqbal Dam with a total theoretical storage capacity of 188 million cubic meters. The main crops grown in both schemes comprise various orchards and assorted annual crops.
A selected set of performance indicators developed by the IWMI (International Water Management Institute) and IPTRID (International Program for Technology and Research in Irrigation and Drainage) were used for the assessment of irrigation scheme performance. Performance is assessed to determine progress relative to strategic goals, as an integral part of performanceoriented management; to evaluate the general health of a system; to clarify the impacts of intervention constraints; to better understand the determinants of performance; and to compare the performance of one system with others or with the same system over time [8] .
In 2007, a database based on secondary data was established. Data were obtained from annual operation and maintenance reports, annual balance sheets (1999) (2000) (2001) (2002) (2003) (2004) (2005) and irrigation reports (1988) (1989) (1990) (1991) (1992) (1993) (1994) (1995) (1996) (1997) (1998) (1999) (2000) (2001) (2002) (2003) (2004) (2005) (2006) ) from the ONID irrigation agency. For analysis, we also used technical reports from ONID on hydroagricultural management and agricultural development of the Mitidja region.
The present study also includes a survey examining farmers' views, opinions, and comments on the irrigation management schemes. In addition, we recorded personal observations regarding the irrigation scheme sites and provide supplementary information on institutional investigations and irrigation management, obtained with the help of key informants. These informants included staff members from the Ministry of Water Resources, agricultural utilities, the Ministry of Agriculture, the National Agency for Irrigation and Drainage (ONID) and the National Agency of Dams and Large Transmission Mains (ANBT).
Results and discussion
The selected performance indicators allowed us to determine the success of water policy objectives. As shown in table 1, the recovery ratio is below the financial sustainability ratio, i.e., 100%, for both schemes. The cost recovery The financial unsustainability of the irrigation schemes is mainly due to the following factors:
Lack of maintenance
The lack of irrigation system maintenance is the root cause of low cost recovery. As shown in table 2, the maintenance budget ratio was found to be lower in West Mitidja, averaging 6.2% of total O&M costs during the period from 1999-2005. In East Mitidja, the maintenance budget ratio was found to be 10.7% of total O&M costs during the same period. Nevertheless, the maintenance budget ratio was very low in both schemes. Approximately half of O&M costs are spent on administrative and management activity, rather than maintenance (see table 2 ). In fact, maintenance is carried out only in the case of emergency, and no funds are available to replace those that have been depleted. During the period from 1999-2005, the average maintenance cost per ha was found to be $40.51 and $14.73, in East and West Mitidja, respectively. This situation has led to a vicious circle of low maintenance/low recovery. Based on international and regional norms, estimated maintenance needs should be within the range of US$100 to 150 per hectare equipped [9] . The lack of irrigation system maintenance in these schemes can also be explained by the revenue diversification measures adopted by the irrigation agency. Indeed, the agency has developed a sideline business which has helped to create new sources of income. These include works, services provided, and equipment sales. However, diversified revenue collection may have negatively impacted water users. The agency was less concerned with farmers' problems; in turn, farmers lost trust in agency services. Consequently, farmers relied less on surface water provided by the agency and therefore looked for other sources of water. As shown in table 3, during the period from 2003-2005, works and water revenue contributed most to turnover in East Mitidja. In West Mitidja, works and equipment sales contributed the most to turnover. This side business has become the major source of income in both schemes. However, these alternative revenue sources do not represent the true purpose of the agency, for which income has traditionally been based on fee collection and recovery. The reduced level of conveyance efficiency in both schemes resulted from numerous reasons such as:  The general age of the irrigation system, particularly in the East Mitidja scheme.  The frequent stoppage of water release without advance notice resulted in repetitive damage to the irrigation network.  Siltation of diversion weir, difficulties in performing maintenance on the intake structure, and reservoir cleaning during the flood.  Lack of means to intervene in the irrigation system, increased rates of breakage, and deterioration of irrigation facilities.  Acts of sabotage, vandalism, and theft downstream of dams as well as throughout the entire network; destruction of hydraulic equipment such as valves, suction, irrigation hydrants and water mains.  Illegal use of water resources by farmers who connected to the irrigation system, and mishandling of valves by farmers, particularly in West Mitidja.  Absence of water police and irrigators' associations, which can serve as counterweights to such practices. Moreover, the agency has no means of measuring the water present. Hence, the amount of water produced and water charges are estimated based on the quantities released and produced, respectively; irrigated areas; cultivation plans; and water consumption standards. The factors mentioned above have had a negative impact on the efficiency of water distribution, as well as on farmers' irrigation management in the schemes. Indeed, according to farmers, when breakage occurred on the network, they waited more than two weeks and sometimes one month for the agency staff to start repairs, which sometimes never began. Consequently, the affected farmers have lost a proportion of their irrigation rates, resulting in yield losses.
Problems also occurred with public authorities. During the survey, three important breakages were caused by a private company working on behalf of the municipality located in the third section of the East Mitidja scheme. Therefore, the irrigation has been delayed and farmers were hesitant to cultivate annual crops. This situation showed a lack of coordination and illustrated the conflict of interest between ONID (irrigation management) and municipality (urbanization plan). Faced with uncertain water distribution, farmers reduced the irrigated areas. The volume of water in dams is so low that estimating the area to irrigate is risky; thus farmers tend to consume more of the water they receive on their farmlands. This problem has been exacerbated by the allocation of quotas among users.
Fee collection constraints
A structural constraint confronted by the irrigation agency is fee collection, particularity with farmers from the West Mitidja scheme. The lack of irrigation from 1995-1999 due to sabotage of the El Moustakbel dam and due to drought in 2002 contributed to the reluctance of farmers to use water provided by the agency. Indeed, the agency holds a claim of $133,532 (in 31/03/2003) on farmers in West Mitidja. Despite this large amount of money and after processing farmers' files, the agency has provided a flexible payment schedule. According to ONID, the level of fee collection averaged 75% during the period from 2002-2005. The level of fee collection is higher in the East Mitidja scheme, because there are fewer private boreholes/wells as compared to the West Mitidja scheme. According to ONID data, 37% of farmers in West Mitidja but only 0.30% of farmers in East Mitidja own boreholes/wells. Therefore, the debts are more easily recoverable from the farmers in East Mitidja. Fee collection is also constrained by worsening irrigation management system "water turn" at the intake level. Intake use is shared among farmers; every farmer has an allotted time in the programmed water turn. It is therefore difficult to penalize farmers individually for non-payment of bills by stopping the water supply. If the intake gate is closed, all farmers will be penalized.
In addition, several other factors were found influencing the fee collection performance such as: poor availability of water services, sub-optimal utilization of bare land, disputes among members of the collective farms, state parcel lands leased to private farmers, inadequacy of the irrigation system for particular farm configurations, water theft during the night, and acts of vandalism on the hydromechanical equipment.
Water and land resource constraints
Growing populations and associated urbanization, as well as drought, have considerably reduced the allocation of water resources to irrigated land [10] . The Hamiz and El Moustakbal dams provided water exclusively to Algiers City in 1988. Notably, 13 million m 3 of water were supplied from the Hamiz dam to the Keddara dam in order to supply water for Algiers City. In 2002, an emergency plan was initiated to obtain water from both dams, resulting in a total volume of 16,745,528 m 3 supplied to urban users, and no supply for the schemes. In 1988 and 2002, the only source of irrigation water for the East Mitidja scheme was the Reghaia marsh. Furthermore, the country's security situation in the 1990s ruined the El Moustakbel dam, and therefore prevented irrigation in the West Mitidja scheme for a period of 5 years. In addition, for the last 8 years, a declining water table has resulted in the allocation of Boureah pump stations to supply urban users.
Reductions in the availability of irrigated land have also been exacerbated by the land reform of 1987. The government converted state farms into either privately owned or collective farms. With land becoming lucrative, growing numbers of landholders have been selling their usufruct deeds even while their land was still state property. This has led to a significant decrease in the number of land users, as well as a decrease in the area under irrigation, particularly in the East Mitidja scheme [10] . About 18% of the total land area of the Mitidja East scheme has now been urbanized. In the West Mitidja scheme, less than 1% of irrigable land (54 ha) has been urbanized. Forecasts for urban population growth in the Mitidja region predicted that consumption of land between 1998 and 2005 would be over 11,000 hectares, reaching 32,000 hectares in 2025 [11] .
Constraints on the water allocation system

At the beginning of the irrigation season
The volumes of water allocated by ONID to the irrigation schemes are estimated according to the needs expressed by farmers (volume contracted). The application process to secure permission for the use of water starts at the beginning of each irrigation season (usually in March). The user must submit his water demand to the agency, by specifying the number of hectares, the crop type, and volume of water desired. In parallel, there is a traditional survey performed by agency staff and ditch-riders, as well as by the heads of the irrigation system, in order to accurately record the land allocated to crop irrigation and cultivation. The irrigators' association may also intervene to express the needs of farmers and to support them during agency proceedings. At the end of the application period, the agency determines the volume of irrigation water per hectare per year for each crop, and may determine water turns. However at this stage, several constraints to effective irrigation management have been identified:  The farmers are very weakly organized [12] . Field surveys indicate that only 3.7% of farmers in East Mitidja and 12.2% of farmers in West Mitidja are involved in farmers' organizations.
 Indebted farmers settle their debt at the beginning of the irrigation season. This creates difficulties in managing claims and deprives the agency of resources to adequately prepare for the new irrigation season.  Small crowds at the irrigation agencies, particularly in the West Mitidja scheme. Due to sabotage of the El Moustakbel dam in the 1990s, the number of wells/boreholes in the West Mitidja has increased significantly. The field survey indicated that more than 90% of farmers are using groundwater resources. In many cases, the wells/boreholes were drilled without authorization, and the authorities lacked the instruments for water management or law enforcement necessary to stop these activities. The consequences of illegal water use led to overexploitation and deterioration of the Mitidja aquifer. Moreover, the use of groundwater in the schemes did not provide any revenue to the scheme agency, reducing its financial sustainability. 
At the ministry level
Conclusion
Algerian irrigation scheme management has been very limited and far from satisfactory. Water policy has not worked efficiently in terms of water allocation among users. The lack of coordination at the institutional and local levels has led to poor monitoring of scarce water-supply services. Furthermore, irrigation management issues are exacerbated by a lack of maintenance, the constraints of fee collection, water allocation system and land reform, low convenience efficiency, weak stakeholder involvement, and the indifference of local administrations. Reforms in the water sector that promote irrigation agency autonomy and cost recovery have yielded poor results. Indeed, both irrigation schemes are in a low equilibrium cycle.
The water policy in Algeria should move toward a water conservation approach that involves both supply-and demand-side management. The objective of the proposed strategy is to sustain the existing infrastructure and resources through a systematized program of repair, maintenance, and rehabilitation to improve performance and reduce water leakage. The maintenance of acceptable operating conditions represents a step toward recovering the cost of sustainability, facilitated by increasing plan allocations for maintenance, involving user groups in management, and appropriately pricing water to cover operation and maintenance costs.
Effective annual maintenance of the irrigation system will increase water flow and create reliable irrigation facilities. These measures will increase the irrigated area and the use of high input/high output cropping systems and enhance water productivity. These innovations could allow the farmers to pay more for water and recover the cost of water systems. However, the intensification of agriculture will require resistance to the pressures to urbanize agricultural land. In addition, water management should also be integrated into urban policy planning and management.
The actions necessary to improve irrigation management are as follows:  Institutionalization of public-private partnerships in irrigation development.  Promotion of participatory approaches in irrigation management and watersaving technology extension programs.  Capacity development for both staff and farmers. Farmer education can increase awareness regarding water conservation as well as management capacity.  Enhanced coordination between the water agencies and the municipalities.  Better regulation of land ownership will contribute to improved management of natural resources.  Adjustment of irrigation system components, such as hydrants, intake, etc.
to the appropriate farm configuration.
 Improvement of the billing system to recognize the particularities of each crop type.  Development and promotion of affordable and appropriate irrigation technologies, particularly the use of water meters to improve accountability.  Support of water police enforcement activities and measures to combat water theft.  Involvement of the irrigation agency in groundwater management activities and legalization of the current illegal boreholes/wells for better monitoring of groundwater resources.
